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THE NON-REDELEGATION DOCTRINE
F. ANDREW HESSICK* & CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK**
ABSTRACT
In United States v. Booker, the Court remedied a constitutional
defect in the federal sentencing scheme by rendering advisory the
then-binding sentencing guidelines promulgated by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. One important but overlooked consequence
of this decision is that it redelegated the power to set sentencing
policy from the Sentencing Commission to federal judges. District
courts now may sentence based on their own policy views instead of
being bound by the policy determinations rendered by the Commis-
sion.
This Article argues that, when faced with a decision that impli-
cates an unambiguous delegation, the courts should not redelegate
unless authorized by Congress to do so. The proposed non-
redelegation doctrine rests on both constitutional and practical
grounds. Constitutionally, judicial redelegation raises substantial
separation of powers concerns because delegation defines how
Congress chooses to perform its core function of setting policy.
Practically, judicial redelegation is bound to affect the substantive
policies that are adopted because the policies that the agent adopts
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. J.D., Yale Law
School. B.A., Dartmouth College.
** Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. J.D., Yale Law
School. B.A., Columbia University. We want to thank Shima Baradaran, Rick Bierschbach,
Paul Cassell, Evan Criddle, David DePianto, Betsy Grey, Zachary Gubler, Zak Kramer, Rhett
Larson, Patrick Luff, Justin Marceau, Jason Marisam, Anne Traum, and Christopher Walker
for their helpful comments on this project. Thanks also to the participants at the University
of Nevada Las Vegas’s Boyd School of Law faculty workshop and the Arizona State Junior
Faculty Workshop.
163
164 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:163
depend on the agent’s unique characteristics and preferences.
Although this Article uses Booker to illustrate the need for the
presumption, the presumption could apply to other contexts in which
Congress delegates its power to make policy and courts have the
opportunity to alter that delegation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the landmark case United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court
rendered the then-binding United States Sentencing Guidelines
merely advisory.1 Before Booker, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
generally required judges to impose sentences within narrow ranges
prescribed by the United States Sentencing Commission. Those
ranges were determined by factual findings that the sentencing
judge made during a sentencing hearing. The Booker Court
concluded that this mandatory guidelines scheme violated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. It explained that the Sixth
Amendment requires that any fact that increases the maximum
possible punishment be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.2 
Because a judge could increase the applicable guideline range by
finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court held
that the mandatory guidelines scheme was unconstitutional.3 The
Court chose to remedy this constitutional violation by excising 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b), the statutory provision requiring sentencing
judges to follow the Guidelines.4 According to the Court, this
remedy best achieved Congress’s goal of reducing disparity in
sentencing.5
Booker wrought a dramatic change in sentencing law. Commenta-
tors have criticized the decision on a number of grounds, including
that the Court erred in concluding that the mandatory guidelines
scheme violated the Constitution,6 that the remedy the Court
chose—rendering the Guidelines advisory—did not match up to the
1. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
2. Id. at 231.
3. Id. at 233-34.
4. Id. at 259.
5. Id. at 254.
6. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 679-80 (2006)
(noting that, in its discussion of the Sixth Amendment issue, the Booker Court never
explained how judicial fact-finding in the pre-Guidelines era could be constitutional under
its reasoning); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 58
(2005) (“Why the mandatory feature of the Guidelines should have been thought to violate
the Sixth Amendment, a provision designed for the protection of criminal defendants, is a
puzzle.”).
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violation,7 and that the decision created unnecessary legal uncer-
tainty because it left important questions unanswered.8 
One critical point overlooked by this scholarship is that Booker’s
remedy redelegated to the district courts power that Congress had
assigned to the Sentencing Commission.9 Congress created the
mandatory guidelines scheme to confine judicial discretion at
sentencing.10 Traditionally, sentencing judges had sweeping
discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the broad
statutory range prescribed by Congress.11 In response to complaints
that this broad judicial discretion led to unwarranted disparity in
sentencing, Congress created the Sentencing Commission and
tasked it with setting sentencing policy by promulgating mandatory
sentencing guidelines that limit the sentencing range available to
judges in particular cases.12 By rendering the Guidelines advisory
7. E.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Booker Reconsidered, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1104 (2010)
(“What the court never fully acknowledged was the mismatch between the problem Booker
set out to cure and the structural remedy it chose.”); McConnell, supra note 6, at 677 (“The
most striking feature of the Booker decision is that the remedy bears no logical relation to
the constitutional violation.”); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1480 (2008) (noting that the Booker remedy
“in many respects resembles the regime that the Booker merits decision held
unconstitutional”); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 115 (2007) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Booker remedy for “fail[ing] to tailor the remedy to the wrong”).
8. E.g., Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395, 417 (2005) (noting that, in failing “to
recognize, much less address” a number of problems raised by the decision, Booker “left a
gaping hole in the Court’s newly tailored Sixth Amendment jurisprudence”); see also Booker,
543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The worst feature of the scheme is that no one
knows—and perhaps no one is meant to know—how advisory Guidelines ... will function in
practice.”).
9. In raising this critique, this Article adds to a growing literature at the intersection
of administrative law and criminal law. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime,
52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime]; Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Richard A. Bierschbach
& Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012); Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996); Gerard
E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998);
Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the
Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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and leaving sentencing to the discretion of district judges, the
Booker Court reassigned to the district courts the power to set
sentencing policy.13
This Article argues that redelegation of this sort is inappropriate.
Because the Constitution confers on Congress the power to make
policy, when Congress unambiguously delegates policy-making
power to a particular agent, only that agent may exercise the
delegated power. Unless Congress says otherwise, a court should
not redelegate that authority, even when that redelegation would,
in the eyes of the court, better achieve Congress’s substantive goals.
In other words, there ought to be a presumption against
redelegation—a non-redelegation doctrine. 
The presumption against redelegation rests on two grounds.
First, judicial redelegation raises separation of powers concerns.
The Constitution empowers Congress to enact policies. A delegation
defines how Congress chooses to perform that task; it assigns the
policy-making power to an agent instead of exercising the power
itself. Redelegation interferes with this basic decision about how
Congress chooses to operate. Redelegation may also affect a wide
swath of policy decisions. Instead of displacing a single substantive
policy decision, redelegation results in the judiciary assigning who
has the power to make a whole body of policy. Redelegation
potentially constitutes a greater intrusion on congressional
authority than other types of judicial review. Second, Congress’s
decision to delegate policy-making power signifies that Congress
has not chosen a particular policy. Instead, Congress leaves it to the
agent to define the exact policy objectives. Because each institution
has different priorities, expertise, information, and tools at its
disposal, the decision of who receives delegated power will inevita-
bly affect the ultimate substantive policy that is adopted. Thus,
when Congress delegates to an agent, the content of the substantive
policy that is adopted will depend on the identity of that agent.
Using the Sentencing Reform Act and Booker as an illustration,
this Article proposes the presumption against redelegation of
congressional authority. It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides
a brief overview of Congress’s authority to delegate. Part II
13. See infra Part II.B.
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describes how Congress delegated authority over sentencing policy
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and it explains how the Booker
Court redelegated that authority to federal judges. Part III argues
for the proposed presumption against redelegation. It begins by
explaining how the presumption would operate. It then provides the
reasons for the presumption. Using the redelegation in Booker as an
example, it explains that the presumption is necessary to protect
the separation of powers and that, because the identity of an agent
is instrumental to defining the policy generated under a delegation,
a court cannot redelegate without changing the policies that are
adopted. The Article then offers some concluding thoughts on the
broader implications of the proposed presumption, as well as some
observations on the effect of the redelegation in Booker. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF DELEGATION
Article I of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to
implement policy through legislation.14 Congress itself need not
develop substantive rules through legislation. Instead, it may
delegate responsibility to an agent to develop that policy.15 Through
this delegation, the agent may exercise power that it otherwise
lacks.16 The agent steps in and fulfills the role of Congress in
setting policy.
There are various reasons why Congress may choose to delegate:
members of Congress may lack the information or expertise to
develop sound policy; they may be unable to agree on what policy to
14. U.S. CONST. art. I (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.”).
15. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (recognizing
Congress’s authority to delegate power to create policy); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 371 (1989) (upholding delegation to Sentencing Commission to promulgate binding
Sentencing Guidelines); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)
(“Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully
exercise itself.”).
16. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987
DUKE L.J. 387, 401 (“Implicit in the notion of separation of powers is a corollary principle
that an agency is constitutionally empowered to act only under the authority delegated to
it by the legislature.”).
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adopt; or they may simply desire to foist the blame for unpopular
policy choices onto someone else.17
Congress frequently delegates its power and regularly confers on
administrative agencies the power to develop policy through
rulemaking.18 Today, administrative agencies are the predominant
federal regulators.19 The policy that agencies promulgate under
their delegated power is not, however, legislation.
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power under Article I.20
Instead, the delegation authorizes the agency to promulgate rules
to clarify ambiguities in the legislation enacted by Congress.21 To
ensure that an agency is merely implementing Congress’s will, as
opposed to legislating, Congress must provide an “intelligible
principle” to guide the agency in its rulemaking.22
Although originally created to constrain delegations, this non-
delegation doctrine has over time been rendered toothless.23 Courts
have upheld many delegations that provide only minimal guid-
17. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk,
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37 (2006).
18. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation Of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 466 (2012) (“Since the New Deal, administrative agencies have carried
out vast amounts of highly discretionary policymaking under broad delegations from
Congress.”); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1191 (2012) (“Since the
New Deal, Congress has routinely delegated broad lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies charged with implementing a range of federal programs.”).
19. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 752 (2007) (“[A]gencies adopt roughly ten
times as many rules each year as Congress adopts statutes.”).
20. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. Not everyone agrees with this position, however. Some
have argued that Congress can delegate its legislative power under Article I. See, e.g., id. at
489 (Stevens, J., concurring); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 66 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Court was probably mistaken from the outset
in interpreting Article I’s grant of power to Congress as an implicit limit on Congress’
authority to delegate legislative power.”). In any event, virtually everyone agrees that a
delegation is appropriate only if Congress provides intelligible principles. See Whitman, 531
U.S. at 472, 489-90 (Stevens, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that he is open to an argument that the “intelligible principle” requirement does
not justify all delegations).
21. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring); Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748, 776-77 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
22. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. For an overview and critique of the doctrine, see Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721
(2002).
23. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 473-74 (2011).
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ance—including delegations to agencies to regulate as “public
interest” requires24 and to set prices through regulation that are
“fair and equitable.”25 In other words, the non-delegation doctrine
places barely any limitation on Congress’s ability to delegate broad
policy making authority to agencies.26 
Congress also frequently delegates policy-making power to the
federal courts.27 Sometimes Congress directs courts to develop a set
of rules through their decisions.28 More often, however, Congress
delegates power to the courts by failing to provide unambiguous
rules of decision. For example, instead of prescribing a bright-line
rule, Congress may set forth a standard that directs courts to
consider a variety of factors in rendering a decision.29 Applying such
a statute requires the judge to make policy judgments based on a
balance of the various factors.30 Similarly, Congress often drafts
broad or imprecise statutory language31 and, because the judiciary
is the default institution charged with “say[ing] what the law is,”32
courts have the responsibility to resolve those ambiguities through
their interpretations.33 And although judicial interpretation is
24. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
25. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423 (1944).
26. See Wright, supra note 9, at 26. Scholars have written extensively about the scope
and nature of the non-delegation doctrine. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash,
Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035 (2007); Posner & Vermeule, supra note
22; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
27. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 421-22 (2008).
28. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (providing that a federal court may grant
habeas relief to a person convicted in state court if the state court’s decision was “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States”). 
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006) (outlining factors courts must consider in
determining whether requiring employer to provide accommodation for the disabled
constitutes an undue hardship).
30. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 59 (1992) (explaining that standards give judges broader discretion). 
31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]
certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most ... judicial action.”).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
33. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (“The interpreta-
tion of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a
judicial function.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2078 (1990). 
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ostensibly an exercise in determining Congress’s intent,34 it is
generally recognized that the preferences of individual judges affect
their interpretations and judicial interpretations are accordingly
instances of policy making.35
II. DELEGATION AND REDELEGATION OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY
For much of American history, Congress set broad statutory
sentencing ranges for most crimes and left judges with discretion to
sentence within those ranges. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, the vast disparity in sentences imposed through this
discretion led Congress to change the system. But rather than
prescribing limits on judicial discretion at sentencing, Congress
elected to delegate that power to an agency—the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court
redelegated that authority over sentencing policy to federal judges.
A. Delegation to the Sentencing Commission
For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, federal
criminal sentencing was left to the discretion of individual judges.36
Under this regime, after a defendant had been convicted, the judge
would conduct a separate sentencing hearing at which she would
impose a sentence based on her assessment of the offender and the
circumstances under which the crime was committed.37 The judge’s
34. In referring to “congressional intent,” we do not mean to say that intentionalism is
the proper method of statutory interpretation or to otherwise take a position on
intentionalism, textualism, or other methods of interpretation. Rather, we use the term
“congressional intent” only as a shorthand for the idea, which is basic to all methods of
interpretation, that Congress has control over policy, and a court’s job is to implement that
policy. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2091 (2002).
35. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 235 (1995) (“Everyone professionally
involved with law knows that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate ‘interstitially,’ which is to
say they make law.”); Lemos, supra note 27, at 425 (describing the influence of judicial
preferences on interpretation and implementation).
36. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998).
37. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 52 (2011).
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discretion was limited by the statutory sentencing range—that is,
she could not impose a sentence above the statutory maximum
sentence for the crime of conviction nor a sentence below any
applicable statutory minimum sentence. Those ranges, however,
were ordinarily quite broad. In selecting a sentence within the
broad statutory range, judges often considered a wide range of
factors—including the defendant’s criminal history, employment
history, family ties, educational level, military service, charitable
activities, and age; harm caused by the criminal act; and the
defendant’s motive.38 Whether to consider any of these factors and
the weight accorded to various factors were decisions left almost
entirely to the discretion of individual judges.39
Leaving sentencing policy to the discretion of individual judges
led to widespread sentencing disparities. Because different judges
had different ideas about the appropriate punishment for a
particular offense and how to weigh various sentencing factors,
similarly situated offenders often received different sentences.40 For
example, a widely-reported sentencing experiment in the Second
Circuit revealed that “[w]here one judge sentenced a defendant to
three years, another judge chose twenty years.”41
To combat these disparities, Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA).42 Among other things, the SRA
created the United States Sentencing Commission43 and dele-
gated authority over sentencing policy to the Commission.44 The
Commission exercised this authority by creating binding sentencing
guidelines that limit and channel judicial discretion at sentencing.45
38. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 22.
39. See id. at 14-15, 23 (recounting the broad discretion judges historically possessed
regarding the identification and assessment of sentencing factors); Hessick & Hessick, supra
note 37, at 51-57 (same).
40. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 74-75 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3257-58.
41. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180,
180 (1999).
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3581 (Supp. II 2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. III 2003).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
44. See id. § 991(b)(1) (authorizing the Commission to “establish sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system”); Wright, supra note 9, at 7 (“The purpose
of the Commission is to establish criminal sentencing policy through the promulgation of
sentencing guidelines.”).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006).
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For each type of offense, the SRA charged the Commission with
promulgating mandatory sentencing guidelines. Those guidelines
identified factors that judges could consider in imposing sen-
tences—usually various facts about how the crime was committed
and the criminal background of the defendant—and set forth
narrow sentencing ranges based on the presence or absence of those
factors. For example, before the SRA, if a defendant violated a
federal antifraud law carrying a possible punishment of up to
twenty years of imprisonment, a judge could have imposed a
sentence of probation—that is, no incarceration—or a sentence as
high as twenty years in prison based on whatever factors the judge
thought relevant.46 After the passage of the SRA, the Guidelines
constrained the judge to impose a sentence within a narrow,
prescribed range. In a fraud case, a judge was required to impose a
sentence in the range of fifteen to twenty-one months for an
offender with no previous convictions who, for example, defrauded
his business partners out of $175,000 using a scheme that required
some planning.47 Thus, through the SRA, Congress transferred the
power to set sentencing policy from individual judges to the
Sentencing Commission.48 
The SRA conferred substantial discretion on the Commission to
fashion sentencing policy. Although Congress articulated several
principles and parameters to guide the Commission in creating
Guidelines,49 it left the Commission broad authority to set the
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (stating that a person convicted of fraud under this statute
“shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both”); see also
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[A] trial judge in the federal judicial
system generally has wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose.”).
47. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 192-93 (giving the “real life” example of
Martin Miller).
48. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1703 (1992); see also Barkow, Separation
of Powers, supra note 9, at 1042 (“[T]he Sentencing Reform Act operated to transfer
significant discretionary power from the judicial branch ... to the executive branch and to
Congress.”).
49. For example, the Act set forth general parameters restricting the size of any given
Guideline range. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). In addition, the Act listed various factors that the
Commission must consider in fashioning the Guidelines relating to the severity of the
crime—such as the harm caused by the crime—and the character of the defendant—such as
whether the defendant had a criminal record. However, the Commission has discretion to
determine what weight to assign to each factor and the Commission may consider factors
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Guidelines range for each offense. In particular, the Commission
had near exclusive authority to identify which factors were relevant
sentencing considerations and to specify what weight would be
given to each factor.50 The Commission used that authority to
exclude a number of traditional sentencing factors from consider-
ation; most visibly, it excluded factors about a defendant’s back-
ground that previously had been treated as mitigating.51 
Congress chose to delegate the task of drafting sentencing rules
to the Sentencing Commission instead of prescribing sentencing
policy itself for three reasons. The first was to capitalize on the
expertise of the members of the Commission.52 Under the SRA, the
Commission consists of seven members—three of whom are judges
and all of whom were intended to have expertise in criminal
justice53—who could devote substantially more time and energy
than Congress to the complex problems of designing a sentencing
system.54 To aid in that task, the SRA also provided for the hiring
of a professional staff and authorized the collection of empirical
data to provide a broad base of information, which the Commission
could use to promulgate and update the Guidelines.55
other than those enumerated in the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7). The Act further limited
discretion by providing principles for the Commission to follow in promulgating the
Guidelines, such as requiring the sentencing range under the Guidelines be near the top of
the statutory range in certain circumstances—for example, if the offense involved violence
or the defendant already had multiple prior felony convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)-(j). The Act
also required that the range be near the bottom of the statutory range in other
circumstances—for example, when the defendant has not committed a serious crime and has
no prior convictions. Id. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-77 (1998)
(discussing the limits Congress placed on the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of the
Guidelines).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 994; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 168 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3351; see also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress
and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 300 (1993).
51. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 56, 61.
52. See Feinberg, supra note 50, at 297; Wright, supra note 9, at 9; see also Barkow,
Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 743 (citing expertise as one reason for the
establishment of sentencing commissions).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
54. Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, Building a Sentencing Reform Agenda: The ABA’s
New Sentencing Standards, 78 JUDICATURE 189, 191 (1995) (“[L]egislatures are poorly
positioned to give sustained attention to the complex workings of the sentencing system as
a whole” and “the tedious business of gathering and assessing data about hundreds or
thousands of cases is not likely to find its way onto the legislative agenda.”).
55. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 64
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The second reason was to reduce political influence on the
content of the Guidelines.56 The theory was that, because its
members were not subject to election, the Sentencing Commission
could make unpopular sentencing decisions that would be too
politically costly for members of Congress to make themselves.57
Congress sought to insulate the Commission from political pressure
by making it an independent agency within the judicial branch,58
exempt from Office of Management and Budget oversight.59
Congress also provided that its members be appointed for a fixed
term of six years and removable only for cause.60 Finally, it directed
that no more than four of the seven members be members of the
same party.61 
That said, Congress did not completely insulate the Commission
from politics. The President has the power to appoint the Commis-
sioners with the consent of the Senate.62 Moreover, the SRA
directed the Commission to submit the initial Sentencing Guide-
lines to Congress for approval,63 and it required the Commission to
submit subsequent amendments to Congress so that Congress has
the opportunity to reject them.64 Further exposing the Commission
to political pressure was Congress’s decision to exempt the Guide-
lines created by the Commission from judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard.65
(discussing the importance of the Commission’s staff).
56. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1636-40
(2012); Feinberg, supra note 50, at 297; Wright, supra note 9, at 8-9.
57. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 934 (1991); Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note
9, at 744-45; Ronald F. Wright, The United States Sentencing Commission as an
Administrative Agency, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 136 (1991).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (establishing the Commission “as an independent commission in
the judicial branch of the United States”). 
59. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 760 n.155.
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 992(a) (2006). 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). These features mimic the basic structures of other independent
agencies. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 722.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
63. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 61 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3244.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
65. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 181 (“It is also not intended that the Guidelines be subject to
appellate review under Chapter 7 of Title 5.”); see also Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra
note 9, at 995 (noting that the Commission “differs from virtually all other agencies because
its rules cannot be challenged as arbitrary and capricious under the APA”). Congress
2013] THE NON-REDELEGATION DOCTRINE 177
To survive arbitrary and capricious review, an agency must provide
a reasonable justification for its actions based on a factual record;
bending to political pressure does not suffice.66 Thus, exempting the
Commission from review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard removes one of the principal protections against political
pressure on agencies.67 
The third reason Congress chose to delegate rather than legislate
itself was that lawmakers were unable to agree on substantive
sentencing policy. Setting sentencing policy requires a number of
value-laden decisions, and members of Congress did not share the
same values.68 Indeed, there was disagreement over the basic
question of which theory of punishment to follow.69 Congress
accordingly left these decisions to the Commission.70
The decision to delegate sentencing policy to the Commission also
reflected Congress’s distrust of the judiciary. Some lawmakers
believed that judicial sentencing discretion resulted in unacceptably
low sentences; others were more concerned that sentencing
decisions were influenced by defendants’ race and class.71 The core
task of the Commission was to promulgate rules limiting judicial
discretion in sentencing.72
Various features of the SRA minimized the judiciary’s influence
on the development of the Guidelines. Although the SRA provided
imposed other requirements found in the Administrative Procedure Act, such as the
requirement that the Commission promulgate Guidelines only after providing notice to the
public of the proposed Guideline and receiving comment on that Guideline. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(x).
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006); see Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 15-16 (2009).
67. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 762.
68. As Kenneth Feinberg, who served as Special Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee and drafted earlier versions of the SRA, noted, the political decision to delegate
was made, in part, because of serious doubt about “whether congressionally proposed
guidelines of such necessary detail and complexity could be enacted by securing the approval
of both the full United States Senate and House of Representatives.” Feinberg, supra note
50, at 297.
69. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 67-68, 77; see also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh,
The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 29 (2003).
70. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 67-68, 77.
71. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 39, 44-45.
72. Id. at 39 (“Liberals and conservatives alike evinced a deep suspicion of discretionary
judgment by federal judges; Congress was determined to limit it.”). 
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for judges to serve on the Commission, those judges constituted only
a minority of the Commissioners.73 Further limiting judicial
influence on the development of the Guidelines was the exemption
of the Guidelines from arbitrary and capricious review.74 Although
that deferential standard of review is intended to prevent judges
from engaging in the policy-making process,75 a judge’s policy
preferences may still have some effect. A policy is less likely to seem
reasonable to a judge who disagrees with it.76 Precluding judicial
review of sentencing guidelines eliminates the risk of introducing
judicial preferences.
To be sure, the SRA did not cut judges entirely out of the
sentencing process.77 The SRA preserved some amount of judicial
discretion in three ways.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). Although the Act proclaimed that the Commission was in
the judicial branch, its location in the judicial branch did not give the judiciary any special
control over the Commission.
74. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 181 (“It is ... not intended that the Guidelines be subject to
appellate review.... There is ample provision for review of the Guidelines by the Congress and
the public; no additional review of the Guidelines as a whole is either necessary or
desirable.”). 
75. The role of the court in conducting that review is not to question the result reached
by an agency, but instead is merely to assess the reasons given by the agency to support its
actions. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 16, at 425.
76. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870-71 (2006) (concluding that
shared ideology increases likelihood of deference to an agency by federal circuit courts).
77. Indeed, one might argue that the Congress that enacted the SRA envisioned a much
more robust policy role for judges. See, e.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1638-39
(contending that Congress expected the judicial branch “would have the greatest ongoing
influence over the development of the [G]uidelines” because of the membership of the
Commission and the Commission’s charge to update the Guidelines based on suggestions
drawn from individual sentencings); see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your
Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 723, 733-47 (1999) (recounting the lengthy legislative history of the SRA and noting
both the ambiguity of the resulting statutory language regarding departures and appellate
review and the views of the House, which were more solicitous of judicial discretion than the
views espoused in the Senate Committee Report).
There is real merit to the argument that Congress originally intended judges to retain
more policy authority than appellate courts and the Sentencing Commission ultimately
allowed. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1646 (detailing how “the Commission,
aided by the Supreme Court, virtually eradicated the judicial departure power”). But
subsequent congressional actions, including statutory changes to the standard of appellate
review, indicate that, at least later, Congress endorsed a near-complete shift of policy
authority to the Commission. See, e.g., PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat.
650, 675 (2003).
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First, the SRA granted judges the discretion to impose a particu-
lar sentence within the range prescribed by the Guidelines.78 That
discretion was not as unfettered as it had been in the past. Before
the SRA, judges had the power to choose a sentence anywhere
within the statutory range. The Guidelines dictated a much
narrower sentencing range that the judge could consider in
imposing a sentence, but the SRA permitted judges significant
discretion to select a sentence within that range.79
The second, perhaps less visible, source of judicial discretion was
the fact-finding function of courts. Under the scheme established by
the SRA, judges were still required to make factual findings to
determine whether an adjustment to the base Guidelines range
applied. Following a defendant’s conviction, the judge would
conduct a separate sentencing hearing to receive evidence that
could affect the Guidelines range applicable to the defendant. If a
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that an adjustment
applied, the judge would adjust the Guidelines range accordingly.80
Because a preponderance of the evidence is such an accommodating
standard, and because the Commission committed the fact-finding
procedures to judges,81 this function gave the courts some level of
control over the applicable sentencing ranges.82
Finally, although most defendants would receive a Guidelines
sentence, the SRA permitted judges to impose sentences outside the
78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1(a) (2004) (“A sentence conforms with
the Guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the
applicable Guideline range.”).
79. The SRA directs judges to consider a number of broad factors including not only facts
relevant to the particular case, such as the severity of the offense and the character of the
defendant, but also factors that implicate broader policy considerations, such as retributive
considerations, deterrence, and incapacitative goals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. II 2003).
80. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (“The Commission believes
that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process
requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the
guidelines to the facts of a case.”). 
81. Id. (“The sentencing court must determine the appropriate procedure in light of the
nature of the dispute, its relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case
law.”).
82. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 338 (2000) (noting “the
hidden, but perfectly legitimate, discretion inherent in making close factual calls in decisions
on guidelines application (as, for example, the determination of the amount of drugs or ‘loss’
foreseeable to a co-defendant in a narcotics or fraud conspiracy)”).
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Guidelines ranges established by the Commission in certain
situations. The ability to sentence outside of the
Guidelines—usually referred to as the power to “depart” from the
Guidelines83—was quite limited. The Commission identified several
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that may permit
departures, including whether the defendant provided law enforce-
ment substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another individual,84 whether the defendant caused more harm
than ordinarily caused by that offense,85 and whether the defendant
had an imperfect defense.86 Judges were also permitted to depart if
they concluded that a case involved circumstances not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.87
Subsequent actions by the Commission and appellate courts limited
that departure ability dramatically.88 Although there were only
limited situations in which departures were permitted, the ability
to depart was an important post-SRA remainder of judicial
discretion. That is because judges retained comparatively broad
latitude to determine how much to depart—in other words, how far
below or above the Guidelines range to sentence a defendant.89 
In short, although the sentencing courts retained some limited
discretion when imposing sentences, they no longer had the
primary authority for setting sentencing policy.90 Instead, the
Commission was the body responsible for identifying the relevant
83.  See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 130 (1996) (discussing the “power
to depart” below the statutory minimum).
84. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1989).
85. Id. §§ 5K2.3, 5K2.5, 5K2.8.
86. See id. § 5K2.10 (victim’s conduct); id. § 5K2.11 (lesser harms); § id. 5K2.12 (coercion
and duress); id. § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are
Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (2008) (characterizing
these factors as imperfect defenses).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. II 2003). The Commission’s identified reasons for
departures, see sources cited supra notes 84-86, were circumstances that the Commission
indicated it had not “been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0.
88. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1646.
89. See generally THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 10.6(d) (2013 ed.).
90. For a discussion suggesting that the SRA structured authority over federal
sentencing as shared between the Commission and judges, see Wright, supra note 9, at 17-
19.
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sentencing factors and assigning weight to those factors. Judges
were responsible for making factual findings necessary to calculate
the Guidelines range, and, in most cases, their discretion was
limited to selecting a particular sentence within the narrow ranges
prescribed by the Guidelines.91
The primary policy-making authority of the Commission was
enforced through strict-appellate review. Appellate courts reviewed
district court calculations and applications of Guidelines ranges,
and they reviewed any sentence based on a departure from the
Guidelines de novo.92
B. Booker as Redelegation
In 2005, the Supreme Court dismantled the sentencing scheme
established by Congress. In a series of decisions beginning with
United States v. Booker, the Court removed the primary authority
for making sentencing policy from the Sentencing Commission and
reassigned it to the federal district courts. These cases established
that judges were no longer required to mechanistically impose
sentences within the Guidelines. The cases also instructed judges
that they could deviate from the Guidelines based on wholesale
policy disagreement with the Commission’s policy decisions and
that judges may not defer to the Commission’s policy judgments, as
embodied in the Guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, the Court held that the Sentencing
Guidelines regime established by the SRA ran afoul of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right.93 In particular, the Booker Court held
that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they
allowed judges to impose sentences higher than those sentences
91. Judges also had broad discretion in imposing sentences for crimes for which the
Commission had not yet promulgated a Guideline. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. II 2003) (“In
the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate
sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2).”).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. III 2003). Although the de novo standard of review was not
contained in the initial version of the SRA, early appellate review was strict and a de novo
standard was applied to many district court decisions to depart. See Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 90 (1996).
93. 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
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that had been authorized based solely on the facts found by the
jury.94
The decision in Booker was based on the Court’s 2000 opinion in
Apprendi v. New Jersey.95 At issue in Apprendi was a legislative
sentencing enhancement that provided for an increase in the
statutory maximum sentence from ten to twenty years imprison-
ment for the unlawful possession of a firearm if the sentencing
judge found that the defendant possessed the firearm to intimidate
someone because of his or her race.96 The Apprendi Court held that
such a statutory sentencing enhancement violated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, reasoning that “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”97 Relying on this
principle from Apprendi, the Booker Court explained that, to the
extent the guidelines system allowed judges to make findings that
resulted in sentencing ranges far above those authorized solely by
the jury’s verdict, the mandatory guidelines system was unconstitu-
tional.98
Freddie Booker’s case illustrates the constitutional issue. He was
convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams of
crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which prescribes
a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum
sentence of life for that offense. Based solely on Booker’s criminal
history and the jury’s finding that Booker possessed 50 grams of
crack cocaine, the Sentencing Guidelines provided for a sentence of
210 to 262 months of imprisonment. The district court judge,
however, did not impose a sentence within that range. Instead, the
judge held a hearing and concluded by a preponderance of the
evidence that Booker had possessed not merely 50 grams of crack
cocaine but 658.5 grams of crack cocaine, and that he had ob-
structed justice. Given these findings, the judge calculated that
Booker’s Guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment,
94. Id.
95. 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
96. Id. at 471.
97. Id. at 490.
98. 543 U.S. at 230-35.
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and the judge imposed a sentence of 360 months.99 In other words,
the judge’s factual findings about the amount of drugs possessed
and obstruction of justice increased the maximum sentence from
less than twenty-two years imprisonment to life in prison, and the
findings resulted in the imposition of a sentence more than eight
years longer than the maximum Guidelines sentence permitted
based solely on the facts found by the jury.
The mandatory guidelines system violated the Sixth Amendment
because it allowed judges to make factual findings by a preponder-
ance of the evidence instead of requiring juries to make those
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.100 One obvious way to remedy
this constitutional violation was for the Court to require facts that
result in a higher Guidelines range to be found by a jury by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Court chose not to require
sentencing juries.101 Instead, the Court severed the provision
making the Guidelines mandatory, thereby rendering the Guide-
lines advisory.102 
The Court explained that a sentencing court is no longer required
to follow the Guidelines when imposing sentences. Instead, a court is
to impose sentences based on its assessment of the factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).103 Whereas before Booker the factors in § 3553(a)
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id. at 232.
101. Four of the Justices in the majority for the constitutional holding—the holding that
the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment—advocated engrafting a Sixth Amendment
“sentencing jury” requirement onto the existing Guidelines system to remedy the
constitutional defect. Id. at 284-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But rather than endorse a
sentencing jury, Justice Ginsburg—one of the five justices who found the Guidelines
unconstitutional—broke ranks with the other members of the constitutional majority and
joined the constitutional dissenters in fashioning the remedy that rendered the Guidelines
advisory. Id. at 244, 246 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 245 (severing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) provides, in relevant part:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
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guided a court’s discretion in imposing sentences within a Guideline
range,104 following Booker courts considered the factors in § 3553(a)
to select a sentence within the much broader statutory range. The
Court reasoned that if the Guidelines were not mandatory, then
they did not fall within the rule established by Apprendi.105
To be sure, because the sentence recommended by the Guidelines
is one of the factors identified in § 3553(a), sentencing courts are
still required to consider the Guidelines in imposing sentences after
Booker. But courts are no longer required simply to follow the
Guidelines recommendation. Indeed, they are forbidden from
mechanically following the Guidelines.106 Courts must base a
sentence on their own assessment of the § 3553(a) factors. Those
factors include not only facts relevant to the particular case, such
as the severity of the offense and the character of the defendant,
but also factors that implicate broader policy considerations, such
as retributive considerations, deterrence, and incapacitative
concerns.107 The statutory language does not prioritize these
concerns,108 and a judge’s choice to prioritize retributivism or
deterrence will likely affect her decision about what sentencing
factors are relevant and the weight they deserve.109
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines....
(5) any pertinent policy statement
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission....
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
104. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
105. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
106. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 50 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351-52 (2007).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also Feinberg, supra note 50, at 301-02 (indicating that
the text of § 3553(a) vests broad policy authority in sentencing judges).
108. See Feinberg, supra note 50, at 292-93 n.5.
109. See Wright, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that the choice of one view of the purpose of
the penal system “over another may affect the importance of different types of facts for those
making sentencing decisions”); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 37, at 87-89
(explaining how various sentencing factors are supported by one or more punishment
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By rendering the Guidelines advisory and directing judges to
impose sentences based on their assessment of § 3553(a), Booker
reassigned to the individual sentencing judges the authority over
sentencing policy that Congress had delegated to the Sentencing
Commission in the SRA.110 No longer do the Commission’s policy
decisions, as codified in the sentencing Guidelines, bind sentencing
judges. Judges must now make their own policy decisions, though
they must consider the Guidelines in making those decisions.111
Booker thus relegated the Commission to an advisory role and
reestablished sentencing judges as the primary authority on
sentencing policy, as they had been before the SRA.112
The majority opinion in Booker did not discuss whether
redelegating the power over sentencing policy was consistent with
Congress’s intent. Instead, it focused solely on whether excising the
provision making the Guidelines mandatory or adopting jury
sentencing would better achieve Congress’s goal of reducing
disparity in sentencing.113 The Court explained that Congress’s
theories).
110. One might argue that striking down the Guidelines did not constitute a redelegation,
but simply restored the power the judiciary had before the SRA in imposing sentence. But
Booker did not simply reestablish the pre-SRA regime. As described in Part III.A., there are
significant differences between the pre-SRA and Booker regimes. See infra note 170.
Moreover, even if Booker did simply reestablish the pre-SRA scheme, it still would constitute
a redelegation. The relevant question for redelegation is whether the judiciary reassigned
a power that Congress had conferred on a particular institution. That is precisely what
occurred in Booker. 
111. One might argue a similar phenomenon occurs when a court refuses to afford
Chevron deference to agency interpretations of regulations based on the court’s
determination that Congress did not confer policy-making power on the agency. See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-32 (2001). Although similar in some respects, that
situation is nevertheless different in that, in that context, a court is arguably not
redelegating. Instead, its determination is that Congress meant to delegate interpretive
power to the courts in the first instance.
112. In the absence of legislation, courts have the default power to make policy under the
common law process. But that is not so for criminal law. It has long been recognized that
federal courts do not have common law power over criminal law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456-61 (2010). To the extent that
courts have power to choose sentences or make sentencing policy, Congress must have
conferred that power. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417-18 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Trial judges could be given the power to determine what factors justify a greater
or lesser sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits because that was ancillary to their
exercise of the judicial power of pronouncing sentence upon individual defendants.”).
113. Four justices endorsed a sentencing jury remedy, and they dissented. See supra note
101. Neither the remedial majority nor the remedial dissent discussed the redelegation issue.
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basic statutory goal in enacting the SRA was to achieve uniformity
by requiring sentences based on the defendant’s “real conduct,”
instead of on the defendant’s crime of conviction.114 According to the
Court, rendering the Guidelines advisory would not thwart this goal
because it would allow judges to consider the defendant’s real
conduct in imposing a sentence. In particular, judges would con-
tinue to consider that conduct when calculating the applicable
Guidelines range. The only difference from the mandatory guide-
lines system would be that, post-Booker, judges would no longer be
required to impose a sentence within the range, but rather to
consider that range and the other factors identified in § 3553(a) in
selecting an appropriate sentence.
As the Court acknowledged, allowing each sentencing judge to
impose sentences based on her application of the § 3553(a) factors
reintroduces judicial discretion that will inevitably result in less
uniformity.115 To combat this lack of uniformity, the Court expand-
ed appellate review of sentences.
Under the SRA, appellate review was designed to ensure that
sentences fell within the Guidelines. For within-Guidelines
sentences, appellate review was limited to determining whether the
district court had correctly calculated and applied the Guidelines.
For sentences outside the Guidelines, appellate courts reviewed the
appropriateness of departures from the applicable Guidelines range
de novo.116
In Booker, the Court replaced this two-tiered scheme with a
single appellate standard of reasonableness.117 Under this standard,
appellate courts were empowered to review all sentences—regard-
less whether within or outside the Guidelines range—for reason-
ableness.118 According to the Court, this appellate review for
reasonableness would recover some of the uniformity lost by
rendering the Guidelines advisory by allowing the circuit courts “to
iron out sentencing differences” in the district courts.119
114. United States v. Booker, 534 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
115. Id. at 263.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp II 2003).
117. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
118. Id. at 261-62; Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of
Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
119. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263.
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The extent of Booker’s redelegation of the power over sentencing
policy from the Commission to the courts was made clear in three
subsequent cases: Kimbrough v. United States,120 Spears v. United
States,121 and Nelson v. United States.122 Following Booker, some
circuit courts resisted recognizing district courts’ sentencing policy
power. They held that district courts could impose non-Guidelines
sentences based on the facts of a particular case, but could not base
sentences on their own general policy determinations about how
much a particular crime should be punished.123 Instead, general
policy determinations about the appropriate amount of punishment
for a crime in the average case should be left to the Commission.124 
The Court rejected that position in Kimbrough v. United States.
The policy issue in that case dealt with the appropriate penalty for
trafficking in crack cocaine. At the time, the Guidelines treated
crack as 100 times worse than powdered cocaine. Put differently, an
individual convicted of dealing 5 grams of crack cocaine was subject
to the same sentence as an individual dealing 500 grams of powder
cocaine.125 The Fourth Circuit had previously concluded that district
courts could not impose sentences based on a disagreement with
this policy explaining that, even after Booker, “sentencing courts
should not be in the business of making legislative judgments
concerning crack cocaine and powder cocaine.”126 The Supreme
Court disagreed. It reasserted that, after Booker, district courts are
not bound by the Commission’s determinations of the policies to
guide sentencing determinations. Instead, the Court stressed that
district courts are to impose sentences based on their independent
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.127
Section 3553(a) directs judges to consider not only facts about the
particular defendant and the crime she committed, but also broader
policy concerns, including what sentence would promote respect for
120. 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
121. 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curiam).
122. 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006), abrogated by
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
124. Id.
125. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95-99.
126. Eura, 440 F.3d at 633.
127. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108.
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the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.128 As pre-
SRA sentencing practices indicated, individual judges disagree
about what constitutes “just punishment.”129 What is more, the
various considerations identified in § 3553(a) will invariably sug-
gest conflicting sentences for individual defendants, leaving
sentencing judges to balance those concerns in individual cases.130
And because § 3553(a) is written in such broad retributive, deter-
rent, and incapacitative terms, it allows judges to identify their own
sentencing factors, including those excluded by the Guidelines. For
example, an individual judge might conclude that an offender’s
prior military service is relevant in determining just punishment
for a particular offense or that a defendant’s age is a relevant
consideration in assessing how to protect the public from further
crimes. Under the SRA such determinations would have been
prohibited, as the Guidelines identified military service and age as
disfavored sentencing factors.131 
Kimbrough thus confirms the breadth of the redelegation of
sentencing policy power from the Commission to the district courts.
Following Kimbrough, not only may courts impose non-Guidelines
sentences based on the facts of a particular case, they also have the
power to make general policy determinations about what sentenc-
ing factors are relevant and the weight those factors ought to
receive.132 Kimbrough also suggested that courts are free to decide
how long a sentence should be for a particular crime in the average
case, so long as that sentence is within the statutory range.133
Courts thus may fashion their own general rules instead of
following the rules established by the Commission in imposing
punishment. 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 212-14.
131. See infra notes 215 and 270.
132. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1668-69.
133. See 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007) (“[It] would not be an abuse of discretion for a district
court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity
yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run
case.”). 
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This is not to say that the Commission plays no role after Booker.
The Court in Kimbrough reiterated that § 3553(a) requires the
courts to consider the Guidelines when making any sentencing
determinations. More important, the Court indicated that more
stringent appellate review might be appropriate in cases involving
other, non-crack cocaine Guidelines.134
In Spears v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the broad policy
discretion afforded to judges under the reasoning of Kimbrough.
The Eighth Circuit had held that, even after Kimbrough, a district
court “may not categorically reject” the crack cocaine ratio set forth
by the Guidelines.135 The Supreme Court reversed, reiterating that
district courts have the “authority to vary from the crack cocaine
Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply
based on an individualized determination that they yield an
excessive sentence in a particular case.”136
Perhaps the clearest indication of redelegation can be found in
Nelson v. United States. The sentencing judge in that case had
imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range on the defendant
after stating that “the Guidelines are considered presumptively
reasonable, so that unless there’s a good reason ... the Guideline[s]
sentence is the reasonable sentence.”137 The Supreme Court
reversed, noting that “district judges, in considering how the
various statutory sentencing factors apply to an individual defen-
dant, ‘may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.’”138
After calculating the Guidelines range, the district court must
conduct an independent assessment of the § 3553(a) factors before
selecting a sentence to impose. In other words, judges may not defer
to the Sentencing Commission’s policy judgments as reflected in the
Guidelines. They must use their own judgment to determine the
appropriate sentence, and that determination will inevitably
require policy determinations.
134. See id. at 109; see also infra note 278.
135. United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc), rev’d 555 U.S.
261 (2009).
136. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S 261, 264 (2009).
137. Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350-51 (2009) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
138. Id. at 352 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
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To be clear, not all of the post-Booker opinions champion district
court policy authority over the Commission. In the post-Booker case
Rita v. United States, the Supreme Court held that courts of
appeals may adopt a “presumption of reasonableness” when
reviewing sentences that conform with the Guidelines.139 In both
Rita and, subsequently, in Nelson, the Court stated that this
presumption only applies at the appellate level; the district court
may not presume that the Guidelines sentencing range is reason-
able.140
In forbidding district courts from assuming Guidelines sentences
are reasonable, Rita is thus consistent with the redelegation of
sentencing policy authority from the Commission to district courts.
But, as a practical matter, one must expect that Rita’s presumption
of reasonableness is likely to preserve at least a limited policy role
for the Commission.141 That is because the presumption has the
effect of creating a bias at the appellate level towards particular
substantive outcomes.142 This appellate level bias for within-
Guidelines sentences, as well as statements in other post-Booker
opinions extolling the virtues of the Commission’s policy process,143
have led to some confusion among the circuits regarding how
strictly appellate courts ought to police sentences outside of the
Guidelines and how much they ought to promote continued
adherence to Commission policy choices.144 Indeed, even after the
decision in Booker, many judges continue to impose within-Guide-
lines sentences, suggesting that the Commission’s policy choices
have enduring effect.
139. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
140. Nelson, 555 U.S. at 352.
141. The Supreme Court appears to deny that the presumption creates a legal bias for
within-Guidelines sentences, stating that the presumption has no “independent legal effect”
but merely reflects the reality that a within-Guidelines sentence is likely to be reasonable.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51.
142. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 118, at 20 (“In other areas of law, appellate courts
often prefer one substantive outcome over another when conducting abuse of discretion
review. But that preference exists because the substantive law prefers that outcome. In other
words, a legal presumption puts a thumb on the scale in favor of a particular outcome at both
the district court and [appellate] level.”).
143. See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 278.
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III. THE NON-REDELEGATION DOCTRINE
In Booker, the Court redelegated sentencing authority to the
district courts in an effort to achieve Congress’s substantive
sentencing goal of reducing unwarranted disparities in
sentencing.145 This Section challenges that approach. It argues that,
when a court interprets a statute containing an unambiguous
delegation, the court should adopt a presumption against
redelegation. The Section begins by describing how the presumption
would work and explaining how the presumption would have
affected the decision in Booker. It then provides theoretical and
practical reasons for the presumption.
A. Defining the Presumption Against Redelegation
When Congress unambiguously delegates policy-making author-
ity to a particular agent, courts should adopt a presumption in favor
of preserving the delegation.146 Under this presumption, when a
statute delegates power to an agent, a court should not redelegate
that power unless the statute authorizes the court to do so. 
145. That sentencing uniformity was the top priority of federal sentencing reform is
conventional wisdom in the criminal justice community. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 50,
at 295-96 (“The first and foremost goal of the sentencing reform effort was to alleviate the
perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing disparity.... Quite frankly, all other
considerations were secondary.”). The Act also sought to promote certainty in sentencing by
abolishing parole and replacing it with terms of supervised release and so-called “truth in
sentencing,” which mandated that offenders serve the sentences imposed on them, with only
limited credit for good behavior. Other purposes of the SRA included shifting the focus of the
federal criminal justice system, adding to the knowledge base about which sentencing
practices best achieve the various goals of sentencing, and revising sentencing policy in
accordance with the most up to date research. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38-39, 161-62 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-22, 3344-45.
146. We limit our proposal to situations in which the identity of the agent is unambiguous,
such as the delegation to the Sentencing Commission, which was explicit. See infra notes
163-64 and accompanying text. By doing so we do not mean to say that the presumption
should not apply when the identity of the agency receiving the delegation is ambiguous. But
we do acknowledge that the case for the presumption in that situation is less strong. In that
situation it is unclear whether Congress meant to confer authority on one particular agent
instead of another. Because one might err in determining to whom Congress meant to
delegate, redelegating the authority may actually better achieve Congress’s intent.
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This presumption against judicial redelegation is similar to the
traditional rule against redelegation in agency law: delegata
potestas non potest delegari.147 Under this ancient maxim, “a
principal can delegate authority to an agent, but the agent cannot
delegate the same authority to anyone else unless authorized by the
principal to do so.”148 As Justice Story explained, the principle
underlying this maxim is that a delegation of authority by a
principal to an agent reflects “an exclusive personal trust and
confidence reposed in the particular” agent.149 
This maxim of agency law appears in the non-delegation
doctrine.150 Because the Constitution does not allow Congress to
delegate its legislative power, Congress must provide in a delega-
tion to an agency an intelligible principle to guide the agency in its
rulemaking. This principle ensures that the rule is merely setting
forth a policy to enforce Congress’s will.151
The maxim is also the source of what some have termed the
“anti-redelegation doctrine”—the rule that, when Congress
delegates policy-making authority to an agent, that agent ordinarily
cannot redelegate that authority to another entity.152 For example,
when Congress delegates the power to enter into particular types
of contracts to the Department of the Army, the Army cannot
147. For an excellent description and analysis of the rule against an agent redelegating
its authority, see Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest
Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168-69 (1928). 
148. Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 892 (2012); see
also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1928) (“The well-known
maxim ‘Delegata potestas non potest delegari,’ applicable to the law of agency in the general
and common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our
federal and state Constitutions than it has in private law.”).
149. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13, at 15 (The Lawbook
Exchange 2004) (1863); see also id. § 14, at 15-16 (“In general, therefore, when it is intended,
that an agent shall have a power to delegate his authority, it should be given to him by
express terms of substitution.”).
150. See Marisam, supra note 148, at 891-92.
151. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
152. See Marisam, supra note 148, at 891 (coining the term “anti-redelegation doctrine”).
For examples of the rule in action, see U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565-66 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (prohibiting the FCC from delegating its power to state commissions); Shook v.
D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 784 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(forbidding the Control Board in the Department of Education from redelegating its
delegated powers).
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redelegate that power to the Department of the Interior.153
Redelegation is allowed only if Congress has authorized the agent
to redelegate.154
Although the anti-redelegation doctrine is similar to the proposed
presumption to preserve delegations, they are not identical. The
anti-redelegation doctrine prohibits an agent from redelegating
power delegated to it by Congress.155 By contrast, the proposed
presumption prohibits the judiciary from redelegating authority
conferred by Congress when seeking to remedy a defective statute. 
Like the traditional anti-redelegation presumption, the presump-
tion against judicial redelegation should not be absolute. Because
Congress has the power to allocate power, it also has the power to
allow the courts to reallocate that power.156 Thus, even when
Congress has unambiguously delegated authority to one agent, the
presumption should be rebutted when Congress also authorizes the
courts to redelegate. 
Saying that the presumption should be rebuttable leaves the
question of how strong the presumption should be. Some presump-
tions are strong and can be rebutted only by an express statutory
provision.157 Others are weaker and may be rebutted by any
indication of congressional intent in other statutory provisions or
the legislative history.158 The presumption against judicial
153. See ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988) (striking down an
effort by the Army to redelegate to the Department of the Interior power that Congress
delegated to the Army, explaining that the redelegation was “inconsistent with the
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law”).
154. See STORY, supra note 149, § 13, at 14; Duff & Whiteside, supra note 147, at 168;
Marisam, supra note 148, at 891. Current law does not require that Congress explicitly allow
redelegation. Courts have adopted a presumption that Congress intends to allow agency
officials to subdelegate to inferior officers within the agency. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359
F.3d at 565 (“When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation
to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative
evidence of a contrary congressional intent.”).
155. Marisam, supra note 148, at 891.
156. Cf. STORY, supra note 149, § 14, at 15 (explaining that a principal may authorize an
agent to redelegate its power).
157. See Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (“[A] waiver [of
sovereign immunity] must ... be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in the statutory text.”). 
158. See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (“Whether and to
what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its
express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.”). 
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redelegation should be strong. It should certainly be stronger than
the traditional anti-redelegation presumption because it involves a
court redistributing the power instead of the agent itself.159 When
Congress delegates policy making to an agent, it presumably trusts
the judgment of the agent in making that policy, including the
agent’s decision to redelegate to make policy. Similar trust does not
extend to a court that is not the recipient of the delegation,160 and
increasing the strength of the presumption would reduce the court’s
ability to manipulate policy through redelegation.161
That said, our goal here is not to define precisely what it would
take to rebut the presumption to preserve delegations. Instead, our
argument is only that the presumption should be rebuttable. At the
least, the presumption should be rebutted when Congress provides
by statute that a court may redelegate authority if necessary to
avoid invalidating a statute. 
Applying the presumption to Booker would have changed the
Court’s approach in its remedial opinion.162 Nothing in the SRA
159. The traditional anti-redelegation presumption is not particularly strong; an express
statutory provision is not necessary to rebut it. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565.
Indeed, courts have adopted a presumption that Congress intends to allow agency officials
to subdelegate to inferior officers within the agency. See id. (“When a statute delegates
authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or
agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional
intent.”).
160. Still, we take no position on the precise standard for rebutting the presumption
against redelegation. Indeed, it may be that the strength of the presumption should vary
depending on the circumstances of the case. Arguably, the presumption should be stronger
when the court seeks to redelegate to achieve a particular substantive outcome than when
redelegation is necessary to avoid a conclusion that a statute is unconstitutional. The
redelegation in Booker was of the former sort. Although redelegation was one way of avoiding
a conclusion of unconstitutionality, it was not the only way. See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 275-76 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that jury sentencing would avoid
unconstitutionality). The Court chose to redelegate on the view that it would better achieve
particular substantive policies. See id. at 252, 254.
161. It also imposes higher enactment costs on the legislature seeking to rebut the
presumption, see Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine
and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2008), but
because the identity of an agent may affect the policy adopted, see infra Part III.B.2,
Congress is unlikely to support redelegation in the name of pursuing a particular policy.
162. When a court is confronted with a statute that is unconstitutional in some respect,
it may strike down the whole statute, or it may sever those provisions that are
unconstitutional and uphold the remainder of the statute. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330-31 (2006). Whether to strike the whole statute or sever the
unconstitutional provision depends on Congress’s intent. Id. But gleaning Congress’s
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suggests that Congress meant to allow judicial redelegation. The
text of the SRA unambiguously assigns the power over sentencing
policy to the Commission by empowering it to promulgate Guide-
lines163 and directing courts to follow those Guidelines.164 The SRA
does not contain language suggesting that the judiciary should
reassign that function, or assume that role itself, if necessary to
preserve the balance of the SRA. Further, other portions of the
SRA—such as the exemption of the Guidelines from arbitrary and
capricious review165 and the provision limiting judges to only a
minority of the Commission166—suggest that Congress meant to
limit substantially the judiciary’s influence on the policy-making
process. The legislative history also confirms that Congress meant
to exclude courts from the policy-making process. Among other
things, Congress rejected a proposal to make the guidelines merely
advisory.167 
The only provision that arguably gives courts the power to
fashion sentencing policy is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which authorizes
a court to impose “an appropriate sentence” when there is no
applicable Guideline.168 One might argue that, because this
provision authorizes courts to impose a sentence in the absence of
a Guideline, Congress must have intended to allow courts to have
the power to set sentencing policy in the event the Guidelines were
rendered advisory. But that argument is not well taken. Read in
preferences is particularly difficult to do in such a situation because of its counterfactual
nature. A court must ascertain not what Congress actually intended, but what it would have
intended had it known that part of the statute would be unconstitutional. See Kevin C.
Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 744-45 (2010). 
163. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. II 2003).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. II 2003) (requiring the court to “impose a sentence of
the kind, and within the range” of the Guidelines).
165. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 181 (1983), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3364 (stating that judicial review of the “guidelines ... is [n]either
necessary [n]or desirable”).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 2003).
167. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 79; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 41.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the
court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in
subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an
offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship
of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses
and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.”). 
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conjunction with the provisions authorizing the Commission to
promulgate Guidelines and requiring the courts to follow the
Guidelines, the clear import of the exception in § 3553(b) is to allow
a court to impose a sentence in the rare instance that the court
faces a situation not covered by a Guideline. That is a far cry from
granting courts a general power to set sentencing policy.169
One might ask, if redelegation were not an option, what other
remedy could the Court have adopted? Entirely striking down those
portions of the SRA that created the Commission and the Guide-
lines would arguably result in even more judicial power over
sentencing policy than the Booker remedy,170 which maintains at
least some role for the Commission and the Guidelines.171 But total
invalidation was not the only remedial option. Another option—an
option supported by four dissenting justices—was to require a jury
to find facts resulting in a higher Guidelines range beyond a
reasonable doubt.172 Although a sentencing jury may have had other
169. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882-83 (2010) (concluding
that statutory provisions authorizing extraterritorial application of a law in some
circumstances are insufficient to establish that the law is generally applied
extraterritorially).
170. Whether striking down the Guidelines in their entirety, rather than making them
“advisory,” represents a redelegation of authority over sentencing policy to the same degree
as the Booker remedy is debatable. Striking down the Guidelines in their entirety
presumably would have restored federal criminal sentencing to its pre-SRA status. As
discussed in the text accompanying notes 36-41, judges had significant discretion at
sentencing, including the ability to base their sentencing decisions on their own views about
issues of policy. But Booker did not reestablish sentencing procedures that existed before the
SRA. The decision invalidated only part of the SRA and left in place other provisions that
differentiate current sentencing from the historic practice. For example, it did not strike
down the requirement that judges articulate their reasons for imposing a sentence in each
case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Indeed, the Court itself did not purport to establish a return
to historic sentencing practices. See infra note 218. To the contrary, it created new
procedures such as the broader appellate review of all sentencing decisions. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220, 260 (2005); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 118, at
8. These features of post-Booker sentencing were intended to promote uniformity in
sentencing, see 543 U.S. at 263, but they will also doubtlessly result in more visible and
coherent sentencing policy by the judiciary than existed prior to the SRA.
171. The precise nature of that role is still a matter of dispute. For example, although the
Court held in Booker that the Guidelines are merely advisory, it has also held that the
Guidelines are sufficiently law-like that the retroactive application of a Guideline prescribing
a higher sentence than the Guideline in effect at the time of the offense violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
172. Booker, 543 U.S. at 271, 284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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drawbacks,173 it would not have resulted in reallocation of sentenc-
ing policy authority from the Commission to the courts.174 Yet
another option available to the Court was to strike down those
portions of the Guidelines that presented constitutional prob-
lems—for example, the provisions directing judges to increase
sentences based on particular factual findings—and leave it to the
Commission to determine whether it could fashion alternative
provisions that did comport with the Constitution. Because other,
non-redelegation remedies were available to the Court, it should not
have redelegated sentencing policy authority to the federal
courts.175
B. Reasons Supporting the Presumption Against Redelegation
1. Separation of Powers
Separation of powers underlies many judicial doctrines and
presumptions.176 The basic idea of the separation of powers is that
different bodies hold the power to enact, enforce, and interpret the
law.177 As is well known, the reason for the division of power is the
173. The remedial majority opposed sentencing fact juries because it believed that such
a process would result in sentences based on plea negotiations, rather than the real conduct
underlying each crime. Id. at 256.
174. To be sure, instituting a sentencing jury would be a redelegation. But the
redelegation is of fact-finding instead of policy, and accordingly is substantially less
pernicious. More importantly, the redelegation would be commanded by the Constitution
itself. Under the constitutional ruling in Booker, Congress does not have discretion to assign
to judges fact-finding that may increase a potential sentence. The Constitution requires that
juries find those facts. See id. at 230. 
175. There were also remedial options that would have resulted in less redelegation than
the Booker remedy. For example, the United States argued that the Guidelines should be
advisory only in those cases with sentence-enhancing factors. Reply Brief for United States
at 19, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105) (“[I]n cases without
sentence-enhancing facts, the Guidelines can operate precisely as Congress and the
Commission intended without implicating any Sixth Amendment issue.”).
176. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1023 (1989) (gathering such presumptions); see also McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 388, 406-07 (1819) (interpreting “necessary and proper” liberally to
avoid judicial interference with congressional policy choices).
177. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (“It is believed to be one of the chief
merits of the American system of written constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted
to government ... are divided into the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative,
and the judicial.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 266 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898)
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mistrust of government.178 Placing all power in the hands of one
entity risks the abuse of that power. Separating the power of policy
enactment from law interpretation and enforcement allows one
branch to limit the actions of the others.
The particular division of power adopted in the Constitution is
designed to secure popular sovereignty while preserving the ability
to enforce the law impartially.179 To that end, the Constitution
assigns the policy-making power to Congress,180 which is account-
able to the public through periodic elections.181 This accountability
makes legislative policies more likely to reflect the will of the
people. At the same time, the Constitution entrusts the power to
interpret those laws and enter judgment based on those interpreta-
tions to the judiciary,182 which the Constitution insulates from
popular opinion through life tenure and salary guarantees.183
Although these protections make the courts ill-suited to enact
policy, they allow the courts to interpret the laws in an impartial
way without fear of popular reprisal.184 This division of power
preserves the ability of the people to control the government and its
policies185 while still allowing the laws to be enforced in an impar-
tial way.186
(“The accumulation of all powers [l]egislative, [e]xecutive, and [j]udiciary, in the same hands
... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
178. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 456-57 (1991).
179. Jerry L. Anderson & Christopher Poynor, A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis
of Iowa’s Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 72 (2012)
(“[O]ne of the salient purposes of separating powers is accountability: the public needs to
know who is responsible for particular actions so they may respond at the ballot box.”).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.”).
181. Id. §§ 2, 3 (requiring elections every two years for representatives and every six years
for senators).
182. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”).
183. Id.
184. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 251-53 (1920).
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 331 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1895).
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 453-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898)
(“[T]he independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society.”).
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This arrangement risks, however, that members of the unac-
countable judiciary will substitute their policy preferences for those
expressed by Congress in a statute. To minimize that risk, the role
of the courts is narrowly defined simply to give effect to the policies
expressed by Congress in a statute.187 A court may disregard
Congress’s policy preferences only when enforcing those preferences
would violate the Constitution.188
Often, the policies enacted by Congress are substantive—policies
that seek to regulate or encourage behavior.189 Statutes appro-
priating money to fund highway maintenance, outlawing money
laundering, and providing tax deductions for charitable giving are
examples. But substantive policies are not the only policies that
Congress enacts. A decision to delegate to a particular agent is itself
a policy decision. It is a decision not to adopt a precise substantive
policy itself, but to assign that responsibility to an agent.190 For
example, when Congress authorizes the EPA to promulgate
regulations on the emission of air pollutants,191 Congress is leaving
to the EPA the task of setting policy on emissions instead of
fashioning an air pollution policy itself.192 
Although all judicial overrides of congressional policy decisions
present separation of powers concerns,193 a judicial decision
disturbing a delegation constitutes a greater intrusion than a
187. See, e.g., Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85, 90 (1938) (“Congress alone is vested with
constitutional power to determine the wisdom of this policy.”); see also Pac. Operators
Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 690 (2012) (“[I]f Congress’ coverage decisions are
mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them. We should not legislate for
them.” (quoting Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985))).
188. See, e.g., Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443, 446 (1924) (stating that the “duty” of
the courts is “simply to enforce the law as it is written, unless clearly unconstitutional”).
189. This is not to say that other law, such as procedural rules, cannot also affect
behavior. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (“The
line between procedural and substantive law is hazy.”). To the contrary, procedural
requirements often influence behavior. Our point is only that all regulations—even
regulations that do not immediately and obviously affect primary behavior—embody policy
choices. 
190. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); Watts, supra note 66, at
32 (explaining how delegations leave policy decisions to agencies).
191. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2006).
192. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529-30 (2007) (discussing EPA’s
discretion under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions from motor vehicles).
193. See, e.g., Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 881 (1984).
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decision displacing a substantive policy.194 First, delegation defines
the process by which Congress exercises its policy-making power:
through the delegation, Congress allocates that power to an agent.
Courts have long recognized that they should not question the
internal workings of Congress. For example, so long as Congress
complies with the procedures prescribed by the Constitution,195
courts will not inquire into how Congress develops its policies.196
That is because judicial oversight poses the risk of the judiciary
hijacking the policy-making process. A similar concern applies to
delegation. A delegation sets forth how Congress plans to develop
policies, and redelegation risks a court substituting its judgment for
the one Congress made.197 The Supreme Court recognized precisely
this point in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri.198 There, Congress
delegated to the Department of the Army the power to enter into
contracts regarding the use of water from a Missouri River reser-
194. Separation of powers concerns are heightened when it is the judiciary that is
redelegating, instead of the agent to which power has been allocated. In that situation, the
courts have the ability to give themselves policy-making authority. This is too much
authority for one branch to hold. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 177, at 266 (“The
accumulation of all powers [l]egislative, [e]xecutive, and [j]udiciary, in the same hands ...
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). To be sure, there is no blanket
prohibition on courts making policy. Courts regularly make policy in fashioning common law
and when interpreting and applying ambiguous statutes. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-04 (1921). But courts hold that power only when
Congress has not acted—or has acted in a fashion that invites judicial policy making. Martin
H. Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor
Weinberg, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1989). Once Congress enacts legislation prescribing
a policy, or assigning the power to set policy to an entity other than the courts, courts must
enforce that legislation.
195. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52 (1983). Indeed, courts often do not even
ask whether constitutional procedures were followed. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144
U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (refusing to examine whether Congress had a quorum in enacting law);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892) (refusing to require Congress to
provide records relating to enactment in its journals). 
196. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 667 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he operational policies of the government itself are activities that lie
peculiarly within the competence of ... legislative bodies.”); cf. Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224, 226, 228 (1993) (dismissing as a political question a challenge to the Senate’s
decision to delegate to a committee the authority to try an impeachment). 
197. This same concern of judicial interference with legislative choices provides an
explanation for the substantial weakening of the non-delegation doctrine. Nathan S.
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J.
1672, 1786 (2012).
198. 484 U.S. 495 (1988). 
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voir.199 The Court held that the Army could not redelegate that
contracting authority to the Department of the Interior, explaining
that the redelegation was “inconsistent with the administrative
structure that Congress enacted into law.”200
Second, redelegation ordinarily has broader consequences than
merely displacing a substantive policy. When a court substitutes its
substantive preferences for those expressed by Congress, the court
affects only that single substantive policy in that legislation. For
example, if a court interprets a statute designed to forbid cars in a
park as allowing cars in the park, that interpretation alters only
that policy on cars in the park. By contrast, a congressional
delegation does not set forth just one substantive policy goal but
instead empowers an agent to fashion a range of substantive
policies. That authorization can be extremely broad.201 Various
statutes have delegated to agencies the power to promulgate rules
in particular areas so long as they promote the “public interest,”202
are “fair and equitable,”203 or are “requisite to protect the public
health.”204 A judicial redelegation transferring the power to set
policy to a different body changes the process for establishing a
broad range of substantive policy.205
Booker provides an example of the breadth of policies that may
be affected by a redelegation. The SRA delegated substantial
authority to the Commission to prescribe sentencing policy.206 It did
not simply authorize the Commission to decide which factors should
matter in distinguishing offenders from each other at sentencing
and what weight to assign to those factors.207 The SRA empowered
the Commission to make basic, fundamental policy choices such as
picking the theories of punishment on which to base the
Guidelines.208 
199. Id. at 497-98.
200. Id. at 516-17.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
202. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943). 
203. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420-23 (1944).
204. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
205. Id.
206. The delegated power was so broad as to elicit a non-delegation doctrine challenge in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
207. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Feinberg, supra note 50, at 300.
208. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 52; Feinberg, supra note 50, at 299-300.
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Booker also illustrates why courts should not redelegate in an
attempt to achieve a substantive goal. The Court concluded that
redelegation was necessary to achieve Congress’s substantive goal
of reducing unwarranted disparities in sentencing.209 But a
substantive goal of sentencing uniformity means nothing in the
abstract. Sentencing uniformity does not call for sentencing all
offenders the same; rather, it requires treating similar offenders
similarly and different offenders differently. Deciding which
grounds should constitute relevant differences involves policy
choices.210 Congress did not make those policy choices, but delegated
that task to the Commission. In other words, Congress’s substan-
tive goal is best characterized not as promoting sentencing unifor-
mity, but as promoting uniformity according to the principles
articulated by the Commission.211 
Empowering the Commission to select among the theories of
punishment on which to base the Guidelines is perhaps the most
visible example of Congress’s broad policy delegation to the
Commission. The different theories of punishment—retributivism,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—often require the
imposition of different sentences based on the same facts.212 For
209. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220, 250-52 (2005). That sentencing uniformity was
the top priority of federal sentencing reform is conventional wisdom in the criminal justice
community. E.g., Feinberg, supra note 50, at 295-96 (“The first and foremost goal of the
sentencing reform effort was to alleviate the perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing
disparity.... Quite frankly, all other considerations were secondary.”). The Act also sought to
promote certainty in sentencing by abolishing parole and replacing it with terms of
supervised release and so-called “truth in sentencing,” which mandated that offenders serve
the sentences imposed on them, with only limited credit for good behavior. Other purposes
of the SRA included shifting the focus of the federal criminal justice system, adding to the
knowledge base about what sentencing practices best achieve the various goals of sentencing,
and revising sentencing policy in accordance with the most up to date research. See S. REP.
NO. 98-225, at 38-39, 161-62 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-22, 3344-
45.
210. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 51-52.
211. Similar reasoning underlies the deference required under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). Chevron holds that, when
Congress delegates to an agency the authority to interpret an ambiguous statute, courts
must defer to the agency’s interpretation because the delegation signifies Congress’s decision
to allow the agency to make substantive policy choices about how to implement the statute.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
1, 3 (2004).
212. As Paul Robinson and Barbara Spellman have explained, sentencing policy consists
of multiple, distinct decisions. First, one must set the goal or theory of punishment. Those
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example, a retributivist is likely to believe that a youthful defen-
dant is less culpable than other offenders and, therefore, would
suggest that a more lenient sentence is appropriate.213 In contrast,
an individual who prioritizes incapacitation would impose a longer
sentence on a youthful defendant because youth is one of the best
predictors of recidivism.214 For its part, the Commission ultimately
decided that age ordinarily should neither increase nor decrease a
sentence,215 perhaps based on the Commission’s conclusion that it
could not select a single theory of punishment to govern the
Guidelines.216 
Age is but one example of the countless policy choices that
Congress delegated to the Commission and that Booker redelegated
to the federal courts.217 Although Congress could have answered all
of these policy questions, it assigned that task to the Commission.
Booker upset this arrangement, disrupting how Congress chose to
implement its function of prescribing policy.218
general statements of theory then must be translated into articulable rules. Paul H.
Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the
Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1129 (2005). At an individual sentencing, the
decision maker must make additional decisions, such as what occurred when the offense was
committed and how to apply the articulable rules to those facts. Id. at 1130-32.
213. Congress identified age as one of the factors that the Commission might want to
include in the Guidelines, but it did not require age to be a factor. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1)
(2006). 
214. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 535
(2012).
215. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2010). 
216. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 53-56.
217. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 33-34 (2012) (discussing how courts have taken
differing positions on whether age ought to be considered a relevant sentencing factor post-
Booker).
218. One might seek to minimize the redelegation on the ground that Booker simply
restored federal sentencing practice as it existed prior to the passage of the SRA. But courts
had the power to set sentencing policy before the SRA only because other statutes conferred
that power on them. The delegation to the Commission in the SRA signified Congress’s
judgment to remove the judiciary from that role and reassign it to the Commission. See
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 39, 44-45. In any event, Booker itself did not purport
to establish a return to historic sentencing practices. To the contrary, it claimed its result
flowed from what remained of the SRA after the provision making the Guidelines mandatory
was excised. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
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2. The Effects of Delegation on Substantive Policy
The separation of powers threat resulting from judicial interfer-
ence with a congressional delegation is not merely some theoretical,
abstract concern. Disrupting a delegation can change the very
policy that the government adopts and pursues. A delegation leaves
policy decisions to an agent.219 What policy an agent adopts depends
on a variety of factors, including its priorities; its expertise; its
access to information; the tools with which it can regulate; and its
organizational structures.220 Because each agent differs in at least
some of these respects, changing which agent makes the policy
decision is likely to affect the policies that are adopted. 
What this means is that, as a general matter, one cannot sensibly
enforce the policy objectives of a statutory scheme that contains a
delegation without enforcing the delegation itself. The agent’s
identity may be the best indication of Congress’s preferred policy
goals, especially when a statute contains a broad delegation. As the
remainder of this Section explains, there are a number of reasons
that a delegation, therefore, must be enforced to determine the
policy to be pursued.
a. Institutional Priorities
The priorities of an agent may affect the substantive policy
choices that the agent makes. When a principal delegates to an
agent, the agent has some level of discretion in carrying out the
commands of the principal.221 How an agent exercises that discre-
tion inevitably will be influenced by the agent’s own preferences
and priorities. Suppose Paul wants to give to charity and is
219. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); Watts, supra note 66, at
37-38 (explaining how delegations leave policy decisions to agencies).
220. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on
Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 458-59 (2009)
(noting the agreement “among legal scholars that institutional design affects substantive
policy outcomes”).
221. Conferring discretion on the agent raises the possibility that the principal will have
different preferences from the agent. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries,
126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 694 (2013). One reason that a principal may delegate to one instead
of another agent is to reduce that “slack.” Stephenson, supra note 17, at 1043.
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choosing between delegating that responsibility to Jenny, who is
passionate about saving animals, and Micah, who wants to
eradicate cancer. Whom Paul picks is likely to determine the
charities that receive his money. Jenny is likely to give the money
to animal shelters, whereas Micah is more likely to give the money
to organizations committed to fighting cancer.
The importance of the decision maker’s priorities on the content
of policy decisions is often discussed in the context of constitutional
delegations. One reason that Congress, and not the courts, has
lawmaking power is that Congress is more likely to implement the
will of the people.222 Members of Congress are elected by the people
and may be voted out of office at the next election if they fail to
enact popular policies.223 The priority of federal judges, by contrast,
is to decide cases and protect individual rights. To protect federal
judges in performing that task, the Constitution provides them with
life tenure and salary guarantees.224 Consequently, Congress is
more likely than the courts to produce policies that align with the
preferences of the people.225 
The various administrative agencies each have a different set of
priorities. Some agencies focus on law enforcement; some on inter-
national relationships; some on preventing discrimination; and
others focus on countless other areas of importance. These priorities
differ from those of the courts, and Congress’s decision to delegate
to an agency instead of the courts will inevitably affect the ultimate
policy that is adopted.
222. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 630 (1993)
(“The countermajoritarian difficulty posits that the ‘political’ branches are ‘legitimate’
because they further majority will, while courts are illegitimate because they impede it.”).
223. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“However awkward or
difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a
political body, expresses the people’s will far more accurately than does an unelected Court.
And the people’s will is what elections are about.”).
224. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 237, 301 (2002).
225. Barkow, supra note 224, at 301. This is not to say that the electoral structure always
works. Sometimes judicial decisions more accurately reflect popular sentiment than
Congress. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012)
(gathering examples of judicial decisions more accurately reflecting popular preferences).
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Consider, for example, the difference in the policies that the
Department of Justice and the courts would adopt relating to
warrantless searches of vehicles by law enforcement officers. The
mission of the Department of Justice is to enforce the laws and
prosecute violations.226 It is likely to draft policies that favor
granting officials broad authority to search vehicles without
warrants. By contrast, because protecting individual rights is a core
mission of the courts, the courts are more likely to adopt policies
limiting warrantless searches of vehicles.227 
Agencies may also prioritize external opinions more than federal
courts. The Constitution does not insulate agencies from external
pressures as it does the courts. Agency heads do not have life ten-
ure during good behavior, nor do they have salary guarantees.228
Instead, Congress has discretion over an agency’s design, and it
may choose to allow more external influence on agency decisions.
For example, Congress may impose procedures that force the
agency to take greater account of legislative opinion by demanding
that the agency submit its proposed regulations to Congress for
approval. Such procedures reduce the slack between the agency and
Congress; they make an agency more likely to honor Congress’s
goals than pursue its own.229 Similarly, Congress may make the
agency take account of the executive’s opinion by, for example,
making the head of the agency removable. Likewise, Congress may
require the agency to receive public input through notice and
comment before issuing a regulation, and respond to those com-
ments in the federal register.230 Requiring agencies to take account
226. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 515 (2006) (establishing authority to prosecute criminal
violations).
227. This is not to say that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not seek to protect
individual rights. Rather, the point is that, because the DOJ is assigned the task of enforcing
criminal law, it is likely to give less priority to protecting rights that may impede that law
enforcement. See, e.g., Michael Wilson, Careful What You Wish For: The Tax Practitioner-
Client Privilege Established by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, 51 FLA. L. REV. 319, 337 (1999) (recounting that the DOJ viewed a particular
privilege as “an obstacle to the investigation and prosecution of fraud matters”).
228. Unlike federal judges, who are provided life tenure and salary guarantees. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
229. Stephenson, supra note 17, at 1043.
230. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (2006).
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of these views will similarly influence the policies that the agency
pursues.
In the case of sentencing policy, the Commission was designed
to be far more responsive to external views than are the federal
courts. Article III strongly insulates judges from political pressures
through life tenure and salary guarantees.231 The Commission is
substantially less insulated. Indeed, in the years after its formation,
the Commission was heavily criticized for its politicized nature.232
Under the SRA, the Commission must submit the initial Guidelines
and Guideline amendments to Congress for approval;233 Commis-
sioners are term limited;234 and Commissioners may be removed for
cause.235 Congress can also more easily monitor sentencing policies
promulgated by the Commission because those policies are set forth
in a discrete body of Guidelines,236 whereas the policies that courts
generate are scattered across thousands of decisions.237 This
political accountability places pressure on the Commission to adopt
more severe sentencing policies because the public consistently
supports harsher crime control measures, and elected officials reap
231. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
232. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 765 (noting that, despite its
institutional design, which seemed to insulate the Commission from political pressure, “the
Sentencing Commission was a highly politicized agency from the outset”); Baron-Evan &
Stith, supra note 56, at 1662 (characterizing the environment at the Commission as “highly
politicized and far from neutral”); Wright, supra note 9, at 84-85 (noting “internal
disagreement and criticism” at the Commission, as well as external criticism of the
Commission for “responding to political pressure rather than to the information it collects”).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 61 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3244. The SRA provides that Congress has 180 days to disapprove a
Guideline or policy statement; they go into effect if Congress does not act. See Barkow,
Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 760-61 (noting that this 180-day delay facilitates
congressional oversight of Commission policies).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 992(b)(1)(A) (2006).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
236. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 731-32; Wright, supra note 9, at
21.
237. See Hessick, supra note 86, at 1113 n.8 (noting the difficulty in accessing information
about sentencing practices). Judges also have a greater ability to obscure the policy choices
that they make by framing their sentencing determinations in terms of factual findings. See
Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 731-32; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 732-
33 (2009) (recounting situations in which courts recharacterized sentencing policy as
sentencing fact-finding).
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political rewards by taking so-called “tough on crime” positions.238
Further pushing the Commission towards harsher penalties is the
presence of a representative of the Department of Justice as an ex
officio Commissioner,239 as well as the appointment of Commission-
ers with previous experience as prosecutors.240 Put simply, because
of their differing levels of susceptibility to external pressure, the
priorities of the Commission and federal judges differ significantly,
and those priorities are key when it comes to the development of
sentencing policy. 
b. Expertise and Access to Information
The expertise and access to information of an agent may also
affect the policies that it adopts. Policymakers do not make policy
for its own sake; they make policy to address actual problems. What
policy is adopted depends on the policymaker’s perception of the
need to combat particular evils and how to combat those evils. As
a general matter, the more information and expertise that a
policymaker has, the greater the likelihood that the policymaker
will make a “better” policy.241 The informed, expert policymaker is
more likely both to better understand the issues at stake and to
fashion more nuanced policies than the underinformed policymaker.
That is most clear for policies that have objectively correct answers. 
238. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 748-52. See generally William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (explaining
the long history of expanding criminal laws, the process and resulting incentive of creating
criminal laws, and suggesting solutions to the attendant problems).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). The Commission need not include representatives from the
defense bar, see id., and the inclusion of the DOJ has been criticized as skewing the priorities
of the Commission towards prosecutors. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1645
n.76 (collecting sources). For example, a former Commissioner noted the influence of the
DOJ’s ex officio representative in convincing the Commission to increase sentencing
associated with fraud offenses. See Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing
Commission, P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 319-20
(1989). 
240. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 764 (footnote omitted) (“Of the
twenty-three people who have served as commissioners, thirteen were former pros-
ecutors—and that does not include the ex officio members appointed by the Attorney
General. Moreover, for much of the Commission’s existence, there have been enough for-
mer prosecutors on the Commission to form a majority, or close to it, at any one time.”).
241. Stephenson, supra note 17, at 1042-43.
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For questions that have objectively correct answers based on em-
pirical data, administrative agencies are generally better equipped
to fashion policy.242 Agency employees generally have more
expertise in those areas than judges, and they have greater access
to relevant information than courts. They may conduct studies,
gather data, and widely solicit public input to inform their determi-
nations. By contrast, courts must rely on the information that the
parties present to them or that they find through their limited
independent research.243 For some other questions, such as how to
interpret a constitutional provision according to a particular
method of interpretation, courts may be better suited because of the
legal training that judges receive. 
To be sure, many questions do not have objective answers but
depend more on value judgments. Resolving those questions
depends more on ideology or some other value held by the
policymaker than the information possessed by the policymaker or
his expertise. But even for those questions, information and
expertise can affect the policy because they allow the policymaker
to make more fully informed value judgments.
For example, expertise and information cannot provide answers
to all questions of sentencing policy. To the contrary, many
sentencing policies—such as which sentencing factors are relevant
and how much weight to assign to each factor—depend on value
judgments that cannot be resolved through expertise or empirical
data.244 And even with respect to those punishment questions that
242. To be sure, empirical data cannot provide an absolutely certain answer; it can,
however, strongly suggest an answer. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent
Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 417, 432 (2012).
243. These differences are highly visible in the context of sentencing policy. Judges have
limited information to inform their sentencing decisions. They must rely on the facts of the
individual defendant and crime, the arguments presented by the parties, and whatever
professional experience the judge may have. By contrast, the Commission has broad
authority to conduct studies and gather data, and it has a professional staff to analyze that
data. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 693-94 (2005) (discussing the demotion of federal judges
from “policy-makers” to “fact-finders” under the Guidelines).
244. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 734 (observing that sentencing
commissions may not have the same informational advantages as other agencies, especially
with respect to decisions that touch upon punishment theories); see Wright, supra note 9, at
10, 12 (“Obviously, formulating sentencing policy involves some pure value choices.... Values
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do turn on empirical questions—such as what sentencing policy
might best reduce crime—“it is not clear that experts greatly
illuminate the issues because the existing knowledge is so
limited.”245 Still, expertise and access to information may influence
an institution’s choices for value judgments.
That appears to have been the case for the Sentencing Commis-
sion, which elected to base the initial Guidelines on an empirical
analysis of past sentencing practice rather than select among
competing theories of punishment.246 The Commission also favored
quantitative sentencing judgments, such as incremental Guidelines
adjustments for measurable factors,247 over moral judgments—such
as balancing the personal characteristics of a defendant against the
crime she committed.248 
Related to the expertise and information that the policymaker
has is the policymaker’s composition. A policy-making body with
multiple members brings more experience, knowledge, and view-
points to the policy-making process than a single individual.249 This
greater breadth of information increases the likelihood of a
policymaker correctly answering questions with objectively correct
answers.
Larger membership may also affect the policies that depend
solely on value judgments, especially when the members hold
different ideological views. The presence of different ideologies may
prompt discussion, and it may reduce the likelihood that the policy-
not susceptible of empirical verification will always dominate sentencing decisions.”).
245. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 9, at 734. But see Wright, supra note 9, at
11 n.33 (describing the value of empirical data “regardless of the theory of sentencing
purposes at work”).
246. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 55, 59; Breyer, supra note 41, at 181.
247. As Kate Stith and José Cabranes have noted, the most common sentencing factor
found in the Guidelines is “quantity—with the result that the severity of a sentence is heavily
dependent on quantifiable factors such as the amount of drugs in a drug conspiracy, the
amount of money stolen in a bank robbery, or the number of unlawful aliens harbored in an
illegal immigration scheme.” STITH & CABRANES, supra note 36, at 68-69; see also id. at 55
(noting that the Guidelines reflect a “strict, quantitative sentencing calculus” approach).
248. See id. at 56 (“[T]he Commission never has explained why it chose to exclude a
variety of factors (especially those relating to the personal history of the defendant) from the
sentencing calculus.”).
249. F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 679 (2009).
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making body makes the value judgment based solely on ideology.250
Studies have shown that ideological diversity on a judicial panel
dampens the effect of the ideology on the outcome of a case.251
Similar effects may occur in administrative agencies.252
c. Regulatory Tools
Equally important are the tools that an agent has to implement
its policy choices. Consider, for example, a delegation to the
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commisssion (OSHRC),
which has the power only to adjudicate claims relating to workplace
safety, or a delegation to the federal courts, which similarly can
formulate policy only in the course of adjudication because of the
constraints of Article III. These procedural limitations may affect
the policy that the agent adopts. As the aphorism that “hard cases
make bad law” reflects, the specific facts of a case may exert
influence on the development of the rule announced in the
decision.253 The rule may be tailored in part to achieve an outcome
in the particular case before the court, instead of being fashioned
with a broad set of cases in mind. 
Moreover, because of the fact-specific nature of cases, adjudica-
tive bodies are unlikely to develop a coherent body of policies. They
tend to generate policies piecemeal as issues appear in a case,
instead of fashioning each policy with an eye towards developing a
larger, unified body of policy.254 For example, a case presenting an
250. The Commission enjoys ideological diversity because under the SRA no more than
four commissioners may be from the same political party. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. II 2009).
In contrast, a sentencing judge is a single-member body.
251. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 140 (2006) (“[D]iverse views, on any particular panel, are likely to ...
produce outcomes, and arguments, that are different and better [because] they include a mix
of perspectives.”).
252. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1185 (2012) (“[B]y diversifying the perspectives an agency takes into
account, we think it is likely to make decisions better and more likely to survive judicial
review.”).
253. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006)
(suggesting that the common law method in general may lead to bad law because the facts
of each case influence the development of law).
254. F. Andrew Hessick, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 895, 931 (2009) (“Courts make rules only in the context of deciding cases. A case
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issue about energy tariffs is unlikely to consider an issue about
energy conservation, although the decision how to regulate one may
influence the decision how to regulate the other. This organic
process may well lead to conflicting and incoherent policies. 
Contrast rulemaking by an administrative agency. Rulemaking
is more akin to legislation than adjudication; the agency sets forth
a rule in a non-adversarial setting to regulate future conduct.
Rulemaking, therefore, is more likely to produce a wholesale policy
based on the average case, instead of a single case as with the
courts. Moreover, unlike a court, an agency engaging in rulemaking
may regulate an entire field at once. It may tailor multiple policies
in a coherent way. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for
example, may craft an energy policy at the same time as an energy
conservation rule.255 And to the extent their policies do not cohere,
the agency may initiate the process to correct those policies instead
of waiting for an appropriate case. 
The difference in regulatory tools for the Commission and the
federal courts is obvious. The Commission fashions policy at a
wholesale level through generally applicable guidelines, whereas
the courts develop sentencing policy on a case-by-case basis.256 The
difference between those approaches may affect policy in various
ways. The wholesale approach by the Commission likely generates
policies that are less influenced by the equities of a particular case
than the courts. Social science research suggests that sentencing
preferences are less harsh in the context of individual cases than in
the abstract.257 By the same token, the Commission’s detached
presenting a question about the well-pleaded complaint rule is unlikely to contain a question
about the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well. Consequently, a court is susceptible to develop
each of the doctrines of federal question jurisdiction independently instead of with a single
cohesive vision of federal question jurisdiction in mind.”); see Oona Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System,
86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650-51 (2001).
255. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2217, 2219-20 (2005).
256. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413, 420 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Commission “exercise[s] no governmental power other than the making of
laws” through the Guidelines process, and further noting that this “lawmaking function of
the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of
the law or adjudication of private rights under the law”).
257. See Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1780-81 (1999). This may explain why individual
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approach may lead to less nuanced policy choices than those
produced by the courts.
d. Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of an agent, and the extent to which
the decisions of those agents are binding, may also shape the
policies that are adopted. Delegating policy to a single agent will
produce greater uniformity than dispersing power among multiple
agents. Although each agent may have similar priorities, informa-
tion, expertise, and tools, the personal experience and viewpoints
of each agent may lead the various agents to adopt different
policies. 
Consider delegations to administrative law judges (ALJs). A
variety of statutes assign adjudicative authority in the heads of
various agencies, and many of those agency heads have delegated
that adjudicative task to ALJs.258 Each ALJ assigned to an agency
has the same tools, access to information, and tasks. But not all
ALJs considering the same claim would come to the same conclu-
sion. Instead, their holdings may differ.259 Moreover, the decisions
of those ALJs do not create binding rules, giving rise to the
possibility that other ALJs will support different policies in future
similar cases. 
Contrast a congressional delegation to an agency to create rules
through rulemaking. The purpose of rulemaking is to create one
uniform rule. Unlike the adjudicative power, rulemaking is
centralized in one body within the agency; different components of
the agency cannot produce different, conflicting rules. Moreover, the
rule promulgated by that body is binding. This delegation structure
judges have used their post-Booker policy authority to impose less severe sentences in
various categories of offenses, such as cases involving white collar fraud and child
pornography. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 6.
258. See Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 517 (2011) (describing the roles of administrative
law judges in various agencies). 
259. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Ferguson, Note, Untangling “Operation Common Sense”:
Reopening and Review of Social Security Administration Disability Claims, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1946, 1960 (1989) (“This was a reference to the Bellmon Amendments, which provided a
statutory mandate requiring the [Social Security Administration] to create a review
procedure to begin overseeing ALJ decisions to increase uniformity.”).
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is thus more likely to produce a uniform policy than a delegation to
several agents. 
The courts and Sentencing Commission have drastically different
organizational structures. Under the SRA, the Commission was the
sole entity responsible for setting policy through binding
guidelines.260 By contrast, each district court has independent
power to set policy. The dispersion of authority among the district
courts greatly increases the likelihood of divergent policies.
Although Booker sought to reduce these differences through
appellate review, the standard of review it adopted is unlikely to
result in sentencing uniformity. Appellate courts review sentencing
decisions only to determine whether they are “unreasonable.”261
Such a deferential standard is incapable of eliminating all the
discrepancies in the policies enforced by the various district
judges.262 Indeed, following Booker, different circuits have developed
different policies regarding sentencing for various types of offenses,
including immigration and child pornography cases.263
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
When Congress delegates power to a particular agent, a court
should presume that it cannot redelegate that power to another.
This proposed non-redelegation doctrine has both constitutional and
practical foundations. Separation of powers demands that courts
not unduly interfere with Congress’s legislative power. The non-
redelegation doctrine acknowledges that Congress sometimes
exercises its legislative power by developing its own substantive
policy through legislation, but it also sometimes delegates responsi-
bility to an agent to develop that policy. Thus, frustrating a
delegation is an interference with Congress’s legislative power.
260. Although the Commission is a multimember body, it acts as a single entity based on
majority votes. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006). 
261. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
262. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 8 (“The Commission’s review
of case law and sentencing appeals data suggests that the current system of appellate review
is not an adequate tool to promote uniformity in sentencing.”). See generally Hessick &
Hessick, supra note 118, at 3 (explaining how the twin Booker remedies of district court
discretion and appellate court review are fundamentally incompatible).
263. See Hessick, supra note 237, at 730-33, 734-36. 
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From a practical standpoint, the non-redelegation doctrine recog-
nizes that the substantive policy likely to be developed after a
delegation is inextricably bound up with the identity of the agent to
whom policy-making authority is delegated. A delegation confers
discretion on the agent, and how the agent exercises that discretion
depends on its preferences and institutional design.
Although this Article has developed the presumption in the
context in which a court redelegates to preserve an otherwise
unconstitutional statute, the presumption need not be limited to
that circumstance. Courts may seek to redelegate power for other
reasons. For example, consider a statute delegating to the Depart-
ment of Energy the power to regulate a promising new, but
potentially very dangerous, energy source. If the Department fails
to promulgate rules quickly enough for a reviewing court, or if the
rules it adopts are not rigorous enough for the court, the court may
seek to redelegate that power to another agency or to the judiciary
itself.264 But that redelegation would inevitably impact the policies
that are pursued. The presumption would impede courts from
assuming this role.
One might argue that a presumption against redelegation is
unnecessary because Congress may simply enact new legislation if
it disagrees with the court’s redelegation. But enacting new legisla-
tion is often difficult to do. Congress may have more pressing
matters on its agenda, and even if it were to take up the issue, the
members may disagree on whether to delegate to the original agent
again, to delegate to some other agent, or to pursue some other
course all together. Indeed, the Booker Court specifically invited
Congress to take action to remedy federal sentencing.265 Congress
264. One example of redelegation is the entry of structural injunctions against government
institutions to remedy constitutional violations. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing
Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265.
Through the injunction, the court redelegates from the supervised institution to itself the
role of developing policy. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“When a judge manages a structural injunction, however, he will inevitably be
required to make very broad empirical predictions necessarily based in large part upon policy
views.”).
265. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265 (“Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in
Congress’ court.”). 
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has held multiple hearings on the matter, but has taken no action
to date.
The aftermath of Booker demonstrates in real world terms the
effects of redelegation. In several areas, federal judges have applied
sentencing policies that differ substantially from those adopted by
the Commission. One particularly visible example of this divergence
is in the context of child pornography.266 Based in part on external
pressure from Congress, the Commission promulgated Guidelines
imposing severe penalties on those offenders convicted of possessing
child pornography.267 Since the Booker decision, a number of federal
judges have criticized these Guidelines,268 and judges routinely
impose sentences for child pornography below the Guidelines
range.269 The treatment of an offender’s military service provides
another example of divergence. In its Guidelines, the Commission
266. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, ABA J., June 2009, at 1, 54; Dan
Herbeck, Sentencing Guidelines May Undergo Revision, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009,
at A2, available at 2009 WLNR 24692343; Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession of Child
Porn May Be Too High, Judges Say, NAT. L. J., Sept. 10, 2009, at 1; Amir Efrati, Judges Trim
Jail Time for Child Porn, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001
424052748704363504575003271494106644.html. 
267. See Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child
Pornography: A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1289-
92 (2010); TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON
THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 3-30 (2008), available
at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/child-porn-july-revision.pdf#search=de
constructing_the_myth; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 59 (“In
child pornography non-production offenses ... average sentences have increased significantly
over the periods due to statutory changes, congressional directives to the Commission to
increase guideline penalties, and Commission-initiated amendments.”).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1110 (N.D. Iowa 2009);
United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004-05 (S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v.
Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011-12 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. Grinbergs, No.
8:05CR232, 2008 WL 4191145, at *10 (D. Neb. Sept. 8, 2008); United States v. Ontiveros, No.
07-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *7-8 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2008).
269. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 73 (“Sentencing in child
pornography non-production offenses has been markedly different from any other offense
type. In recent years, the rates of non-government sponsored below range sentences have
exceeded within range rates.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Post-Booker Leniency in Child
Pornography Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT. REP. 87, 87 (2011) (“[I]n 2010, more than 40 percent
of below-Guideline sentences that were not sponsored by the government were imposed in
child pornography sentences. That is the highest rate for any offense type in the federal
system.”); Hansen, supra note 266, at 56 (“[M]ore than one third of all child porn defendants
sentenced for nonproduction-related offenses in 2007—351 out of 1,025 offenders—received
sentences below the recommended guidelines.”).
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stated that military service was “not ordinarily relevant,”270 but
following Booker, a number of judges elected to impose shorter
sentences on military veterans.271 
The divergence is not limited to a difference between the courts
and the Commission. Different courts have adopted different
policies from each other as well.272 Not all district judges, for
example, have reduced sentences based on an offender’s military
service. The Booker Court assumed that these differences could be
“ironed out” through appellate review in the circuit courts. But the
appellate review of sentencing decisions is deferential and thus
incapable of eliminating all the discrepancies in the policies
enforced by the various district judges. Moreover, the circuit courts
themselves have disagreed on the appropriate sentences for various
types of offenses.273 
It may be that the courts will apply policies that are preferable
to the Commission’s. Federal sentencing policy has become increas-
ingly harsh274 and, at times, insensible.275 But Congress delegated
270. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2007). Historically, military service
was often treated as a mitigating sentencing factor. See Hessick, supra note 86, at 1116-17.
The initial Guidelines did not specifically indicate whether military service ought to affect
a defendant’s sentence. When federal judges began departing from the Guidelines based on
prior military service and other good works, the Commission responded by promulgating a
Guideline indicating that military service is “not ordinarily relevant” at sentencing, and thus
essentially prohibited federal judges from accounting for such service at sentencing. Id. at
1120-21. 
271. United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04CR30PS, 2005 WL 300073, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3,
2005); see also Amir Efrati, Judges Consider New Factor at Sentencing: Military Service,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2009), http://onlinewsj.com/article/SB126221697769110969.html. In
response to the district court judges’ decisions, the Sentencing Commission recently amended
the Guidelines to ease its restriction on the consideration of military service. See 75 Fed. Reg.
27,388, 27,391 (proposed May 14, 2010).
272. The U.S. Sentencing Commission reports that judges are increasingly sentencing
outside of the Guidelines, and that the sentence actually imposed on offenders after Booker
increasingly depends upon the identity of the sentencing judge. U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 8. In other words, those judges who sentence outside the
Guidelines are doing so using factual and policy considerations that are not consistent with
one another. See id.; see also Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010).
273. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 217, at 6; Hessick, supra note 237, at
730-36. 
274. The increasingly punitive nature of federal and state sentencing policies are the
result of a number of shortcomings in the political process—an underinformed electorate,
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory Minimums and Popular Punitiveness, 2011 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 23, 24-28; media portrayals that perpetuate misperceptions about crime, Sara
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to the Commission the task of creating sentencing policy, and the
possible superiority of the courts’ policies does not justify redelega-
tion.
Indeed, decisions since Booker reveal an effort by the Court to
mitigate the effects on substantive sentencing law caused by its
redelegation. It has held that sentences imposed within the Guide-
lines range may be presumptively reasonable.276 It has repeatedly
stressed that the Commission is better suited than the courts in
formulating sentencing policy because of its ability to gather data
and the expertise of its staff.277 And it has suggested that circuit
courts should afford greater weight to Commission policy judgments
that are the result of the Commission’s access to national data and
the expertise of its staff.278 These deviations from Booker reestab-
Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market Driven News
Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 402 (2006); and politicians who are
willing to adopt flawed penal policies to appear tough on crime, Rachel E. Barkow &
Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing
Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1977-83 (2006).
275. See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 267, at 26-30 (demonstrating how the Guidelines
regularly imposed harsher sentences on possessors of child pornography than on defendants
who sexually assaulted children).
276. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007).
277. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); Rita, 551 U.S. at 348-50; see also
United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Kimbrough and Gall both
emphasize that, after Booker, the Guidelines’ claim on judicial respect derives from the fact
that the Sentencing Commission ‘has the capacity courts lack’ to frame Guidelines on the
basis of ‘empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with
appropriate expertise.’” (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007))).
278. In Kimbrough, the Court held that district courts were free to sentence outside the
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the crack cocaine Guideline. The opinion was
limited to crack cocaine, and it appeared to place some limits on the ability of district courts
to sentence based on policy disagreements to cases involving particular Guidelines. The
Court intimated that district courts were not constrained by the crack/powder sentencing
ratio because the crack cocaine “Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of
its characteristic institutional role.” 552 U.S. at 109. In “formulating Guidelines ranges for
crack cocaine offenses,” the Court noted “the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum
sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national
experience.’” Id. (citing United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring)). The Court noted that “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s
recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’” Id. (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350
(2007)). And, in such an ordinary case—that is, in a case in which the Guidelines in question
do “exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role”—“closer
review may be in order” when a district court bases its decision to impose a non-Guidelines
sentence on a policy disagreement. Id. The Court reiterated this possibility of “closer review”
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lish, to some degree, the importance of the Commission and the
Guidelines, but they are only second best solutions to the problem
caused by the initial redelegation.
in a subsequent case, Spears v. United States, stating that a district court’s “inside the
heartland departure (which is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines and necessarily disagrees on a categorical basis) may be entitled to less respect.”
555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
